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Abstract—Owing to Satoshi Nakamoto’s brilliant idea, a P2P public ledger is shown to be implementable in anonymous
network. Any Internet user can then join the anonymous network and contribute to the P2P public ledger by providing
their computing power or proof-of-work. The proof-of-work is a clever implementation of one-CPU-one-vote by
anonymous participants, and it protects the Bitcoin ledger from illegal modification. To compensate the nodes for their
work, a cryptocurrency called Bitcoin is issued and given to nodes. However, the very nature of anonymity of the ledger
and the cryptocurrency prevent the technology from being used in fiat money economy. Cryptocurrencies are not
traceable even if they are used for money laundering or tax evasion, and the value of cryptocurrencies is not stable but
fluctuates wildly. In this white paper, we introduce Gruut, a P2P ledger to implement a universal financial platform for fiat
money. For this purpose, we introduce a new consensus algorithm called ‘proof-of-population,’ which is one instance of
‘proof of public collaboration.’ It can be used for multiple purposes; as a P2P ledger for banks, as a powerful tool for
payment, including micropayment, and as a tool for any type of financial transactions. Even better, it distributes the profit
obtained from transaction fee, currently dominated by a third party, to peers that cannot be centralized. Energy
requirements of Gruut are so low that it is possible to run our software on a smartphone or on a personal computer
without a graphic card.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Bitcoin, Proof of Work, Consensus, Distributed ledger, Fiat Currency, Cryptocurrency,
Peer-to-peer, Finance
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1 INTRODUCTION
A trusted third party has been assumed to be neces-
sary for recording transactions in a trusted manner.
In this model, the trust provided by the third party
helps participants to make sure that the recordings
are not manipulated. At the expense of providing
the trust, the trust third party receives transaction
fees from participants. It works well if participants in
the network agree on the cost of running the trusted
third party. However, unforgeable online recording
of transactions by peers (not by a third party) is
necessary, if it is not possible technically, econom-
ically, or politically to set up a trusted third party
that secures transactions. Also, even though there
is a trusted third party already in place, it is more
desirable to use a P2P ledger, if implementable,
when the cost of maintaining the trusted third party
is too high, not that it is technically or economically
unavoidable, but that it makes undue profits. Provid-
ing a P2P ledger and eliminating the third party will
have great impact on the market run by the trusted
party by giving another competing technology not
relying on the third party for recording transactions.
Gruut1 provides business entities working on real
(not cryptocurrency) economy with a new business
environment, where they need not rely on the trusted
third party to manage transactions in a trusted way,
and they will enjoy much lower transaction fees that
are distributed evenly to peers running the network.
2 GRUUT’S VISION
Our vision is not just to introduce yet another
cryptocurrency, but rather to create an alternative
model to the business model relying on the trusted
third party for real economy. We propose Gruut
blockchain not that we want to dismantle govern-
ment authority, not that we distrust the current trust
model provided by trusted third parties such as
banks, card companies, and government authorities,
but that we want to create a new business environ-
ment supported by peers for real economy, to supply
1. Gruut stands for grassroots movement in various business sectors
by our fully-decentralized blockchain.
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2an alternative having competitive edge over tradi-
tional single party models having high transaction
costs, to provide go-green technology, and to set up
p2p ledgers with better security. Pursuing Gruut’s
vision requires to develop a ledger technology that
achieves three important goals: full economic (not
political) decentralization, P2P ledger for real econ-
omy, and scalability.
1) Economic decentralization: To replace ledgers
managed by the third party with peer-to-peer
public ledgers providing high level of trust,
and to distribute the fee to peers that cannot
be centralized. Anyone can join by installing
GruutApp on smartphone to contribute to run-
ning Gruut blockchain. Every contributor on
Gruut will have the equal chance to get rewards
irrespective of their stake/computing power.
2) Ledger for real economy: To build up a
government-friendly ecosystem that is compat-
ible with legacy/legal financial system. We are
aiming at economic transparency so that Gruut
should be incorporated into the legal financial
platform dealing with transactions in fiat cur-
rency.
3) Scalability: To provide a blockchain that scales
out on demand and thus can process a high
volume of transactions generated during on-
line/offline payment.
Gruut project is an initiative to introduce the
public blockchain technology in real economy-based
business areas while solving various fundamental
issues in current blockchain technologies. Running
a blockchain ledger as a platform for transactions
in the real economy essentially limits anonymity.
3 ISSUES WITH CURRENT PUBLIC
BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY
Our work is mainly inspired by Bitcoin [1] which,
in 2009, provided an idea that eliminates the cen-
tralized mint and decentralizes the ledger for on-
line currency system. Coins in Bitcoin network
are issued in a distributed manner by managing
one global immutable ledger by peers. To make
the ledger immutable, Nakamoto developed a novel
voting mechanism that can resolve inconsistency in
ledger by votes of anonymous peers. Because nodes
on the Internet cannot be precisely distinguished,
a mechanism is needed to realize one-node-one-
vote. Identities such as IP address can be easily
dominated. Bitcoin uses so called the proof-of-work
(PoW) to implement effectively the conceptual idea
of one-CPU-one-vote, but PoW requires a large
amount of hash calculation. However, two impor-
tant and innovative ideas – anonymous voting and
PoW (or Proof-of-Stake PoS) to implement it –
have caused two critical issues that prevent current
cryptocurrencies from playing a role in real world
economy: anonymity and decentralization.
• No decentralization: Hashing powers or stakes
have been dominated by small group of people.
• No economic transparency: All transactions are
processed under random addresses of which
owner is not identifiable.
Economic decentralization. The top seven miner
groups have more than 70% of the world hash-
ing power according to blockchain.info. Nowadays,
cryptocurrencies are not considered to be decen-
tralized economically as much as expected when
first proposed. Crypto51 [2] provides the attack
cost to mount 51% attack against current cryp-
tocurrencies, including Bitcoin and Ethereum [3].
For example, launching at attack for one hour cost
against Bitcoin costs 582,622 USD, and 364,099
USD against Ethereum. Proof-of-stake (PoS) [4]–
[8] also lets high stake holders control the ledger,
and double-spending is reported to be possible.
Delegated PoS (DPoS) [9], [10] in EOS elects only
21 block-producers in the whole world to maintain
the blockchain and, obviously, is very far from the
decentralization idea by peers. It is even more cen-
tralized than traditional banking systems considering
that more than hundres of banks work collabora-
tively. To prevent centralization by a small group
of people, one-person-one-vote is the only solution,
but others are just approximation of it.
Economic transparency. Cryptocurrencies effec-
tively realize online currency system as non-
traceable as real currency. Since Bitcoin has been in-
troduced, intense focus has been on cryptocurrency,
and that triggered a flood of variant cryptocurrency
systems. As of this writing, the number of cryptocur-
rencies is 1,384. Almost all cryptocurrencies using
the blockchain idea, however, are non-traceable. As
cash in real world is not easy to be traced even
when it is used for crimes, such as money laundering
3and tax evasion, cryptocurrencies are not traceable
except when they are exchanged with a real currency
at an exchange. Modern society, however, moves to
a more transparent economy owing to the growth
of credit cards, check cards, and paychecks. The
current cash model has been gradually diminished
by those alternatives. Cryptocurrencies represented
by Bitcoin, however, go toward an opposite direction
that we are moving into. One example that showed
their non-transparency was that U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission decided not to accept Win-
klevoss Bitcoin Trust in March 2017 owing to its
non-transparency of transactions [11].
Now, we discuss cryptocurrency as a currency.
The aim of Bitcoin designers is ambitious, but Bit-
coin and other cryptocurrencies also fail to become
a currency. People do not want to use Bitcoin to
purchase goods, but for speculation, and there are
many reasons to do so. One such reason is that it is
separated from the real currency and it works within
its own ecosystem, and the other is the high cost for
mining:
• Closed ecosystem: Current ledger technologies
rely on the closed ecosystem to keep miner’s
economic incentive stable. That is, cryptocur-
rency is for reward and transactions are only in
the cryptocurrency.
• Mining cost: Current blockchain ledgers are not
good for processing small-valued transaction
because of its high mining cost.
Closed ecosystem of cryptocurrency. In the current
cryptocurrency networks, reward is given with the
cryptocurrency in the network, and transactions in
the ledger are done only in the same cryptocurrency.
This closed ecosystem has the effect of keeping the
value for attacker’s incentive very stable, but on the
other hand restricts the usage of the ledger only for
cryptocurrency-related transactions. If a currency for
transactions in the ledger is one and a cryptocurrency
for reward is another, the economic incentive might
not be suitable to attract miners. Let us assume that
the Bitcoin ledger processes USD transactions, and
rewards including coinbase and transaction fee are
given in Bitcoin. This currency separation will obvi-
ously discourage attackers from mining honestly but
encourage them to misbehave (forging transaction
blocks) when the value of Bitcoin plummets and
the rewards get smaller than the transactions in
blocks. When the value goes too high, transaction
fees will be too high to treat low-valued transactions.
This is why most cryptocurrencies are recursively
defined within their networks. Even though it cannot
separate currencies for transactions and for rewards,
there must be a way to assess the value of the
currency to give real economic incentives to miners.
Cryptocurrency exchanges exist for this purpose, but
the values of cryptocurrencies are greatly changing
owing to speculation.
Mining cost. On the other hand, cost itself for
mining blocks (solving PoW) nowadays is too high
to be used to transfer small value transactions. For
example, one block mining by the very large mining
pool AntMiner S9 costs 19,598.50 USD without
counting the hardware cost [12]. Thus, it is quite
obvious that we cannot use Bitcoin for processing
transaction having small values.
Consequently, the closed ecosystem separated
from the real-world economy and the high cost for
mining make PoW/PoS-based cryptocurrencies in-
applicable to real world transactions, such as buying
goods.
There are also several technical limitations in
the current PoW-based cryptocurrency systems that
prevent them from being used as a real currency for
transactions:
• Energy: According to Bitcoin energy consump-
tion index by Digiconomist, the number of U.S.
households that could be powered by the energy
used for Bitcoin mining is 4,049,860 [13].
• Slow confirmation: It takes at least 60 mins for
a block to be finalized theoretically, although
it usually takes substantially more, owing to
the limited block size and to the large number
of transactions. There are faster coin networks
such as Ethereum [3], using GHOST and hav-
ing a faster block time (aiming at 12 seconds),
but Ethereum still needs three or more minutes
of confirmation time.
• Scalability: The number of transactions that can
be processed per second is only 4 ∼ 20, which
is not scalable enough for the global scale of
transaction networks.
Instead of using PoW, there are cryptocurrency
systems that use PoS. PoS-based system where the
stake holders put their stake to vote allegedly solves
those problems. However, simultaneous forging of
several chains is claimed to be possible, and even
4profitable; although there are still debates on the ef-
fectiveness of attacking PoS. The philosophy behind
PoS is that a stake holder will behave owing for
its own sake. DPoS (Delegated PoS) is a compro-
mise between the fully-public ledger and the private
ledger. Voting powers or block makers are limited to
21 nodes in EOS network [14], [15].
4 BACKGROUND
4.1 Anonymity and no-stake properties
Two important attributes for a P2P public ledger
in current cryptocurrency systems are anonymity
and no stake2. That is, it is believed that a P2P
public ledger for cryptocurrency should be run by
anonymous peers having no stake in the integrity
of transactions. Though the “anonymity” require-
ment provides transaction senders/recipients with
transaction privacy or non-traceability, it should not
be confused with node anonymity. That is, current
cryptocurrency systems allow anyone to run a node
without identification. There are two reasons for this:
one is that there is no effective way to identify
a person who runs a node on a global scale, and
the other is allowing anonymity makes it easier to
expand the ledger network.
The “no stake” requirement allows anyone to
join the network to maintain a ledger, and lets
anyone having no stake in the integrity of trans-
actions to process them (or sign via PoW/PoS). If
a transaction should be signed by nodes having a
stake in the integrity of transactions, it should be a
private ledger, where only nodes having a stake are
allowed to join the network. Therefore, the ledger
cannot provide the publicly-accepted trust, and ac-
tually they do not aim to provide it. Also, nodes in
a private blockchain already have enough incentive
to participate in the network even without explicit
rewards (cryptocurrency), because if they do not
participate they might suffer losses by the corrupted
ledger, which is implicit rewards. Therefore, to run
a public ledger on the Internet operable by random
peers, we need the requirement of no stake.
These two properties form the baseline for a
public blockchain where anyone can join and leave
the network. However, it is also necessary to have an
2. Here, we note that the stake in the PoS-based ledger is different
from the stake in this context, but the stake in PoS is put to vote on a
chain by anyone having no direct stake in the integrity of the block.
effective way to resolve potential incoherence of the
P2P ledger by anonymous peers having no stake in
the integrity of transactions. This is a hard problem,
but gracefully solved by PoW of Bitcoin [1].
4.2 P2P ledger run by identified nodes hav-
ing stake – Private blockchain
Hardness of voting in the anonymous network is the
value of Bitcoin’s PoW-based blockchain, but the
very anonymity hinders application of blockchain
technology to the real world financial platform, be-
cause the anonymity makes voting very inefficient.
Institutes in the financial service sector, therefore,
gets interested in “private blockchain” and “consor-
tium blockchain” technology. If a distributed ledger
run by identified (opposite to anonymous) nodes
having conflict of interests (opposite to no stake)
is needed, then the ledger falls into the category of
private/consortium ledger. In the private/consortium
blockchain network, it is possible for entities to run
a network without any reward of “coin” or “min-
ing”, because entities having conflict of interests or
having a stake in the private/consortium blockchain.
The chains, therefore, can be regarded as just re-
dundant sharing of databases for security purpose.
We note that entities in a private or a consortium
blockchain can authenticate each other easily, and
thus can make consensus easily without PoW/PoS
when discrepancy happens in the database. This
ledger involves practical Byzantine fault tolerance
(PBFT) protocols [16], [17], and there is a huge
research body in this area. Current experimental
projects based on private or consortium blockchain
have therefore focused on the security obtained by
duplicate database management by entities having
conflict of interests and the efficiency of coher-
ence of distributed database systems. To deal with
transactions among parties with conflicting interests,
variants of PBFT protocols have been adopted for
the private chain. Most of PBFT protocols are not
scalable enough to be used on an Internet-size pub-
lic chain network because current PBFT protocols
support up to around 20 nodes [18].
4.3 P2P ledger run by anonymous nodes
having no stake – Public blockchain
The problem solved by Bitcoin is sometimes called
Byzantine generals problem (BGP), which is to
5Figure 1. Design space for blockchain according to block producers and Gruut’s position
make a consensus among generals under the as-
sumption of faulty generals [19]. However, it is more
exact to say that Bitcoin is an attempt to solve BGP
among “indistinguishable” anonymous users on the
Internet. Different from BGP, the problem to main-
tain a public ledger involves voting by anonymous
users including malicious ones over the Internet,
whereas works on BGP focus on how to make a
consensus efficiently among already identified nodes
having a stake. Bitcoin network is built to make an
immutable public ledger on the Internet, where any
participant with an Internet connection (and thus,
obviously having no stake in the integrity of the
ledger) can freely join and leave the network while
remaining anonymous. Even worse, those partici-
pants may corrupt the public ledger for own profit.
There is a high chance for multiple ledgers to coexist
by corruption of peers in the network. The obvious
way to make a consensus on one sole public ledger
is to vote, but the voting among anonymous users in
a trusted and secure manner cannot be easily done.
Bitcoin solves the problem by PoW that effec-
tively implements one CPU for one vote. That is,
PoW (similarly PoS) enforces an entity to behave as
a single node instead of many Sybils. Owing to PoW,
when a node behaves as a Sybil, it has a less prob-
ability to get rewards because its hashing power is
divided into multiple forks (for multiple voting) and
the chance to add its block decreases. Blocks having
multiple transactions together with PoW are chained
to the public ledger, which makes up the blockchain.
PoW is calculated by network participants called
“miners”, and the miners are rewarded with coinbase
and transaction fees in cryptocurrency. To modify
the ledger, an attacker forks the chain by adding a
different transaction to the existing blockchain and
adding PoW that at last should catch up and override
the honest chain. To do so, the attacker should have
more computing power to calculate PoWs for its
blockchain. When it reaches the point where the
manipulated blockchain is longer than the existing
chain, it releases its own chain and overrides the
chain for its own sake. The attacker or more possibly
the group of attackers should have 51% or more
computing power to succeed the attack (51% attack).
Cost of 50% attack is not high in some small scale
network, and cost for running 51% attack is listed in
crypto51.app [2].
4.4 Trust by private chain vs. by public
chain
A private/consortium ledger can be easily modified
by the institute itself or by agreement of majority
members of the consortium. A boss or a group of
people with power can order to change the ledger.
This means that only the insiders can trust the
integrity of the ledger, but the ledger’s integrity
cannot be trusted by anyone outside the institute or
the consortium. However, a public ledger should not
be modifiable, and the ledger should be able to give
trust even to an outsider. That is, a public ledger
must be able to provide publicly-accepted trust on
the ledger’s integrity, which is not the goal of con-
sortium/private ledgers. Public trust can be acquired
by letting random peers having no stake participate
in the network. Gruut blockchain, therefore, should
be a public chain run by random peers.
64.5 Sacrificing decentralization for perfor-
mance
Combining PBFT and PoW/PoS is a recent trend in
designing public blockchain. Because peer-to-peer
networks composed of large number of nodes are
inherently slow, recent trends are to elect a small
group of nodes (usually around 20 nodes) by a
voting algorithm and allow only those nodes produce
blocks using PBFT. Thus, researches have focused
on how to enhance PBFT in terms of scalability and
performance. Very recently, Thunderella has been
proposed for this purpose [20], but this approach
inevitably introduces the problem of centralization
by those small number of nodes. We note that our
approach is different in that Gruut does not elect any
block producers but any node can be a block pro-
ducer and thus, it does not raise any centralization
issue.
5 GRUUT’S APPROACH AND BENEFITS
5.1 How to construct a fully-decentralized
(or one-entity-one-vote) and low mining-cost
public ledger?
Our answer is a P2P ledger run by identified
nodes having no stake. To build a public ledger
that allows only one vote for one node is to require
nodes wanting to run the network to be identified3
before joining the network. That is, Gruut does real-
name (ID)-based voting (for privacy, Gruut sees
only pseudonyms, so it cannot identify a node.).
Our observation is that not both anonymity and no
stake attributes are needed to build a practical public
blockchain, but “no stake” requirement is enough.
Instead of requiring both attributes, we can build a
public blockchain run by identified nodes requiring
only no-stake property. By giving up anonymity, we
3. Viable solution for online identification of a person via smart-
phone can be provided by the telco’s identification system or by
the bank’s accounting system, considering that in many countries a
telco and a bank must adopt the real-name accounting system called
KYC (Know-Your-Customer) [21]. For example, in US, a Customer
Identification Program (CIP) is a requirement, where financial in-
stitutions have to check the identity of individuals wanting to do
financial transactions. Also, many projects on distributed KYC are
ongoing these days. For example, IBM announced proof-of-concept
of its shared corporate know your customer (KYC) project with
Deutsche Bank, HSBC, Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group (MUFG)
and the Treasuries of Cargill [22]. Also, the node can be required to
connect its wallet to its bank account to join the network, which will
make the online identification easy.
can make every vote distinguishable, while allowing
anyone join our network once it is identified. There-
fore, one entity on Gruut has only one voting power,
which enables us to implement easily double voting
prevention and decentralization.
Figure 1 shows Gruut position in design space
of blockchain. Gruut is so unique in the design
space that it is a public ledger run by any identified
nodes, whereas public ledgers are usually run by
anonymous nodes and private ledgers are run by
identified nodes having interest in the ledger.
Instead of using the inefficient PoW-based vot-
ing, Gruut uses signature-based voting that has very
low mining cost, where a node on Gruut is required
only to compute a standard digital signature (such as
ECDSA, RSA signature, etc). Computing signature
for a block can be done within a millisecond even
on a smartphone, and thus it lowers the entry bar-
rier to near zero. This low mining cost contributes
decentralization in terms of entry barrier. Any legal
smartphone subscriber (thus, real-name identified)
can join in our Gruut.
Operating environment of the public chain is
different from that of the private chain. The num-
ber of nodes is huge, and the transitional forking
occurs frequently owing to the large network delay.
Therefore, we need a different strategy from PBFT-
based majority voting algorithms taken by a pri-
vate/consortium blockchain such as Hyperledger, by
EOS, or by recent enhanced PBFT-based consensus
algorithms [14], [20], [23]. Our strategy is to use
PoP (Proof of Population)-based majority voting in
our P2P platform, which does not care who signs a
block but cares how many voters sign a block. In a
nutshell, PoP is a game for a miner to win rewards
if the miner (we call it a “merger”) was the first who
gathers some number of signatures for a block. This
is analogous to PoW, where the first miner wins the
block rewards who solves the hash puzzle. Thus, in
PoP, the number of signatures is a proof that as many
population have supported the block.
The chain without anonymity requirement seems
to be a private/consortium blockchain because it is
run by real-name-identified nodes, but it is more of
a public chain considering that blocks are signed by
random nodes having no interest in the integrity of
a block and that nodes can freely join and leave our
network.
Benefits of using PoP as a consensus algorithm
7are many:
• Double voting prevention: Gruut network can
prohibit one node from voting for two or
more forks, because double voting is easily
detectable by its identity (See section 4.3 for
meaning of double voting prevention in PoW).
• Decentralization: Gruut network can prevent
any single entity having large resources such
as hashing power or stake (and thus, large
voting powers) from centralizing the network
by giving one vote for one entity, and the entry
barrier to Gruut as a node is near zero.
• Go green: Mining cost is substantially lower
than PoW-based ledger, and thus, even a smart-
phone can run our GruutApp as a node.
• Micropayment: Owing to the low mining cost,
the economic incentive for miners does not
need to be very large, which means even small
value transactions can be processed efficiently
in the network. This implies that Gruut can be
used for on/offline payment.
5.2 How to distribute rewards fairly for de-
centralization?
Our answer is more control by the system over
greed for producing blocks. For true decentral-
ization, not only entry barrier should be low and
one node has one vote, but also rewards should be
equally distributed to peers irrespective of how much
resources such as computing power or stake they
have. By uniformly random algorithms, Gruut deter-
mines which nodes are to produce a block in every
turn, and thus, every node has an equal chance to
get rewards. Without competition, however, a node
might not work hard to slow down the processing
speed. To avoid this, Gruut gives a small room for
competition among nodes by designating a group
of nodes as candidate block-producers instead of
designating only one node. Philosophy behind this
design choice is that letting nodes compete each
other without any control causes a small group of
nodes who have large resources (usually, capital) to
always win the race, and it eventually destroys the
idea of decentralization. This is the case in Bitcoin
network, Ethereum network, and EOS network. On
the contrary, Gruut controls greed of nodes for pro-
ducing blocks by fair algorithms, which guarantees
decentralization even under any circumstances.
• True decentralization: Gruut is run by fully-
decentralized peers with smartphones, and ben-
efits are evenly distributed to peers by giving
equal chances to produce blocks.
• Low stale block rate: Stale block is those block
that are dropped owing to transitional forks.
Not all the nodes but only a designated group
of nodes compete to win rewards, and thus, the
number of transitional forks, and thus, the stale
block rate significantly decrease.
• Low network bandwidth consumption: Block
broadcasting for gathering signatures is greatly
reduced because the number of nodes compet-
ing is small.
5.3 How to frustrate an attacker forking se-
cretly for double-spending?
Our answer is proof of public collaboration. In
PoP network, and to add a block, S random peers
among the participants make votes for the block by
adding their signatures, where S ≥ 1. The longer a
chain becomes, the more voters support the chain.
Thus, when an inconsistency in the ledger occurs, a
chain fork that has more supporting voters will be
chosen, which is a typical implementation of major-
ity voting. An attacker who wants to double-spend
has to be able to fork a longer chain than the main
chain. PoP, however, is different from PoW in that
an attacker cannot secretly make a dishonest fork on
its own but needs a public collaboration of signers.
This increases the security level drastically, because
a secret forking (revealing a longer dishonest fork
after secretly gathering signatures) in PoP is not pos-
sible, but a forking requires asking random signers
determined by Gruut system to collude taking the
risk of being reported.
5.4 How to deploy Gruut in mainstream
business area requiring economic trans-
parency?
Our suggestion for economic transparency is
identification. In another layer, a sender and a re-
cipient of a transaction on Gruut network may be al-
lowed to make a transaction only after they are iden-
tified. This customer identification is not necessary
to build Gruut network (Gruut requires node identi-
fication only), but it is for economic transparency to
avoid negative effect such as money laundering and
8tax evasion. Depending on the property of transac-
tions occurring on Gruut, the level of identification
may vary. For example, customer identification is
mandatory for DApps dealing with financial trans-
actions in fiat money. However, for DApp requiring
censorship resistance, customer identification can be
omitted. We note that Gruut blockchains are multi-
ple, and every application domain has its own Gruut
chain. Therefore, all the transactions recorded in this
network are identifiable by a government authority
if needed. The new ledger can work as a universal
peer-to-peer financial platform dealing with any type
of asset including real currency and cryptocurrency.
For privacy, pseudonyms together with public key
certificates can be used. Using the platform, a peer-
to-peer bank can be implemented, where the ledger
of the bank is managed not in a bank’s server but
in a distributed immutable ledger run by peers using
smart phones and computers. Roles of the bank are
not to manage private ledger at its data center, but to
sell financial instruments on Gruut network.
Considering that financial transactions should be
conducted in real-names in almost all countries in
the world, we do not need to stick to anonymous
transactions. Rather, we are interested in highly-
transparent public ledgers on fiat-based transactions.
Benefit is quite obvious:
• Economic transparency: High degree of trans-
parency and traceability can be achieved, while
preserving privacy (using pseudonym, among
others) on the ledger. Thus, PoP transactions
can work as a countermeasure on tax evasion
and money laundering.
5.5 How to deal with price volatility for run-
ning real financial platform?
To overcome issues of closed ecosystems, our sug-
gestion is to use a fiat currency for transaction.
This design choice, and by treating transactions for
legal tenders simplifies the closed ecosystem prob-
lem: the currency on our ledger is already the very
currency in the real world, and thus, no concerns
arise for price volatility. It also uses a cryptocur-
rency called “GRU” coin for transaction fee on the
ledger. To effectively absorb the price fluctuation, all
transaction fees are evaluated in terms of fiat money,
and then GRU coins amounting to the price are used
for the transaction fee. Therefore, GRU coin is not
a security token but a utility token in that it is used
as a processing fee for various types of transactions
including financial transactions and content (music,
movie, game, etc) purchase. Benefits of using fiat
currency are many:
• Money control by government: Fiat currency
is the main currency on Gruut, and GRU coin
is just an assistant medium to expedite fiat-
based transactions. Governments do not need
to concern themselves with “losing control over
de-facto currency”.
• Immunity to price volatility: Owing to dealing
with the fiat money on the ledger, it can be used
freely for commerce and online/offline payment
without any concern to value fluctuation.
• Fiat-based economy: Unlike cryptocurrency-
only blockchain, Gruut is not limited to the
cryptocurrency-based business area, but can
penetrate into the mainstream business, owing
to its power of dealing with fiat money. DApps
developed and operated on Gruut can more
easily deploy its business model into the real
world. Combined with zero-mining cost, this
will accelerate business growth.
5.6 What about scalability to accommodate
all the P2P transactions?
Answer to the scalability issue is divide-and-
conquer using multiple local blockchains in par-
allel and to adopt inter-chain protocol. All of the
current blockchains try to make one global single
ledger. Bitcoin has one single ledger over the entire
world, and Ethereum has one too. Keeping all trans-
actions from all over the world in a single ledger
is a suboptimal solution for scalability. Gruut’s
mining is very lightweight compared to PoW-based
blockchain, which means that it is more advanta-
geous already in terms of scalability. However, if
the number of transactions grow, one single ledger
might not be able to handle them efficiently in time.
Gruut’s approach to scalability is to introduce multi-
ple chains, a local chain per area (e.g., one chain per
country or state, or application domain). By doing
so, the amount of transactions to be processed in one
local chain will be drastically decreased, and thus the
scalability issue is addressed by divide-and-conquer
structure. Another interesting idea we introduce is
the inter-chain transaction protocol that processes a
9transaction occurring from one chain and going to
another.
5.7 What is the difference of Gruut’s smart
contract?
Our strategy is to run a blockchain per DApp
type. Heavy smart contracts slow down network
throughput, and even worse they affect even non-
contract transactions. Even though everybody ac-
cepts that smart contracts are needed in many sce-
narios, some smart contracts require big storage and
huge computation power. We are going to divide
into two types of smart contracts and run them on
separate chains.
1) Light smart contract: Fast and light smart con-
tract will be included for managing ledger sta-
tus (e.g., user balance). It has a deterministic
Turing machine with constrained power.
2) Heavy smart contract: Customized local chains
for heavy smart contracts will be used. It is op-
timized for running program codes, and it can
produce deterministic or probabilistic results.
Probabilistic results over nodes can be merged
into one result by sharing them over the block-
chain. For performance, external oracle nodes
(such as AWS lambdas) can be linked.
Summing up, Gruut can work as a universal
financial/business platform replacing traditional
ones run by central trusted parties owing to an
innovative consensus architecture adopting fiat-
based transactions.
6 GRUUT ARCHITECTURE
To realize the new blockchain, PoP using digital
signatures is used instead of PoW or PoS, which
is a realization of explicit voting by individuals.
Unlike PoW and PoS that rely on the amount of ac-
cumulated computation power or stake, PoP makes
a decision according to the accumulated number of
people who support a block. Thus, when a forking
occurs due to an attack or mis-synchronization to
produce multiple versions of the chain, the chain that
has more population or the chain that is supported
by more voters is chosen to be the main chain.
Figure 2. Ê A merger requests signatures of a block to signers.
Ë A signer responses with a signature. Ì Adding a block to the
chain is the game that a merger wins who gathers first some
pre-determined number of signatures for the block.
6.1 Nodes: signer and merger
There are two types of nodes in the PoP network: a
node in PoP network that contributes to maintaining
the public ledger by signing blocks and a node
that contributes by merging transactions and block
signatures into one block and chaining it to the
existing blockchain. The former is called a signer
and the latter node is called a merger. A signer
is prompted to allow a PoP wallet to generate
a signature when it gets a signing request for a
transaction block. This can be automatically done by
setting opt-in for the automatic signing. We expect
that the signing module runs on a smart phone. By
installing our signer app, a signer can make some
money as a reward for signing a block. A merger
collects and validates a certain number of transac-
tions to compose a transaction block. Also, for each
transaction block, it must collect some numbers of
valid signatures for the block from signers and insert
them into the block. This is illustrated in Figure 2. A
merger’s software also can run on a smart phone or
on a desktop/server computer. A merger node should
advertise itself or give promotions to make more
signers join in their network so that it can promptly
collect as many signatures as needed. When a signer
joins the network, it will register itself to mergers,
and a merger can ask the signer to sign a block
thereafter. When a signer joins in multiple mergers,
it has to set a priority among mergers. Participating
nodes in PoP network should be rewarded for their
work to maintain the network. Merger nodes are
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rewarded for collecting/validating transactions and
for collecting signatures for those transactions, and
signer nodes are rewarded for their contribution by
generating signatures. The reward is given to their
accounts in the ledger.
6.2 Joining as a node on Gruut network
To make Gruut network run, we need to make a
newly-joined node identified by an authority, which
can be seen as a bootstrapping procedure for trans-
action processing by peers. For the bootstrapping,
we can use online identification service (or KYC)
of telcos, banks, or blockchain-based distributed
KYC service providers as explained in section 5.1.
Especially, a node is required to connect its wallet to
its bank account to withdraw, which will make the
online identification easy.
Bootstrapping: Identification for registration.
One who wants to run as a node on Gruut should
be identified with a real name before entering the
network. A user generates a public key/private key
(pubI , prvI) pair and submits the public key pubI
to a third party. The third party identifies a newly-
joined node and issues a pseudonym ID (pID) and
CertI , its certificate of (pID, pubI). It also stores
(ID, pID, CertI) tuple in its database. If it is a
user already registered, the registration request is
rejected.
Pseudonym management. Gruut networks verifies
the certificate CertI , and checks whether pID is
already registered or not. If everything is okay, it
runs an authentication protocol to check whether the
user has the corresponding private key, and issues
a network ID (nID) for the pseudonym pID (or a
user can generate a random network ID by itself).
Now, the user generates its own public key and
the corresponding private key pair (pubG, prvG), and
gets CertG the public key certificate for the pair
(nID, pubG) from Gruut networks. Thus, Gruut net-
works’ role is to issue the public key certificate to a
node after confirming that it is identified by the third
party. Gruut networks stores (pID, nID,CertN ) tu-
ple in its database. The public key can be updated
if necessary in the ledger by adding a new public
key and a network ID pair. Similarly, a network ID
can be updated by re-registering it in the database,
but the change logs should be managed on Gruut
network.
Figure 3. A block is signed by signers having closest IDs from
the hash of transactions in the last block upon request of a
merger.
User. The user stores all of them including
(pID, pubI , prvI , nID, pubN , prvN ) in its wallet,
but its public key and its network ID pair signed by
Gruut networks is then registered in the blockchain.
A user having its certificate successfully registered
in the ledger can now play a role of a signer, a
merger, and/or a customer as the user wants. A node
can change a network ID for privacy.
Separation of ID registration and management
for privacy. Here we note that the identification
third party’s role is limited to management of real-
name and pseudonym pairs (ID, pID), and thus, it
cannot recognize a node (ID) on Gruut blockchain
because the identity on the chain (a signer’s or a
merger’s identity) is nID which it has no knowledge
of. Also, Gruut networks cannot see who a node is
because it has only a pseudonym and a network ID
pair database. That is, the third party for identifica-
tion has one half of the real name data base, and
Gruut networks has the other half of it. Therefore,
it is not possible for one entity to figure out who a
node is, but two institutes must get together to reveal
the identity of a node.
Peer-processing transactions. We also stress that
neither of the identification third party nor Gruut
networks involves in processing transactions, but
peers in the network process them. Rewards are
given to peers.
6.3 Processing transactions on Gruut
When a transaction occurs from A to B, the trans-
action record including amount of money, date/time,
transaction purpose and their IDs is signed first with
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A’s and B’s private signing keys, and then it is sent
to mergers by either A or B. Mergers are chosen by
the system algorithm according to a predefined hash
function of the previous blocks in the chain. Now, a
merger who gets the transaction record validates and
verifies the record, and it makes a transaction block
by merging some numbers of records. When a block
is composed, a merger collects a predetermined (but
adjusted regularly) number of signatures as soon as
possible to add the block to the chain. A signer
and a merger can make a signature only for a block
generated after they have joined the network. Here,
the signers for a block is not chosen on a merger’s
own, but they are chosen by a hash value, which
is basically output of a random but deterministic
function on the previous blocks’ transaction records
except signatures (similar to avoiding stake grind-
ing attack). To change the group, therefore, it is
necessary to change the previous blocks’ transac-
tions so that the hash value of them chooses the
attacker’s signer group. Consequently, changing a
signing group of one block involves changing all the
signing groups of all the preceding blocks and also
of all the following blocks.
1) A transaction is broadcast to the merger’s net-
work, and mergers wait until some amount of
transactions are collected.
2) A merger who has not produced any block for a
period of time collects transactions into a block,
computes signer ID’s, finds the closest signers
among the queue of signers registered on his
cache roster, and sends the block to the signers.
3) A signer checks validity of the block, and
responds with its signature on the block to the
merger.
4) A merger waits until it gets some number of
signatures on the block, and if successfully
gathers them, it signs the block and broadcasts
the multi-signed block to all mergers.
5) Mergers accept the block only if it is valid
and not double-spent, and the sending merger
is eligible.
6) Mergers notify their acceptance of the block by
creating the next block in the chain, using the
hash of the accepted block as the previous hash.
A signer has to keep all the block IDs it has
signed. A signer makes a signature for a block after
checking
Figure 4. A block in PoP network is signed by signers and then
by mergers. The signer group is determined randomly by the
hash of transactions of the previous block.
• Time stamp in the block matches with the cur-
rent time considering the time synchronization
error in the distributed network. If not, report
to the authority and ignore the block (e.g., in
Bitcoin network, a block is accepted as valid if
its timestamp is greater than the median of the
last N blocks).
• The request is for a block generated before it
has joined the network.
• The request is for a block generated before the
last block it has signed and finalized. If so, the
signing request from a merger will be rejected
automatically.
• The request is for another block having a trans-
action in the block that it has already signed.
If so, the signer ignores it and notifies this of
the merger. This notification has the effect to
promptly inform the merger of the message
“you are late, and the transaction is already
added.”
• The request is for a block including a trans-
action that is not consistent with one it has
signed. If two blocks (regarded as a result of
transitional fork) have one source transaction
ID to multiple output transactions, it is regarded
inconsistent. If so, the signer reports to the
authority and broadcasts the merger ID and the
sender ID to the network to kick him/her out
of the network. All the requests will be ignored
from the abuser.
6.4 Merger/Signer group selection
Merger group selection. Instead of letting
all mergers in the network compete, only
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a limited number of mergers chosen by
m1 = H(1||m′1||H(TN−1), TN−2), · · · , TN−t),
m2 = H(2||m′2||H(TN−1), TN−2), · · · , TN−t), . . . ,
mM = H(M ||m′S||H(TN−1), TN−2), · · · , TN−t)
compete among each other to get rewards, where
mi is the chosen merger, m′i is the i-th merger in
the last block, Ti is all the transactions in the i-th
block excluding signatures, M is the merger group
size, and t(≥ 1) is the finalization threshold. This
strategy can substantially reduce the number of
transitional forks, and prevent random mergers from
trying to forge a block by measuring merger’s ID
quality.
Signer group selection. The signer group for
a block Bi is chosen according to the hash of
transactions in the previous blocks (see Figure 4).
That is, the list of signers is to be calculated by
s1 = H(1‖H(TN−1)), s2 = H(2‖H(TN−1)), . . . ,
sS = H(S‖H(TN−1)), where si is the signer ID,
and S is the number of signatures needed to build
the proof. This retrospective nature and enforced but
unpredictable selection of a signing group makes
corruption of the ledger much harder.
A signer/merger ID chosen by the algorithm
might not be valid because it has not yet joined, or
the node with the ID might not be active. In that case,
a node having the closest ID in distance (Hamming,
euclidean, Manhattan, etc.) will be chosen. How
close the distance is determines the quality of the
merger itself and the quality of the signer group
chosen by a merger. The distance works as a penalty
for a competing chain when transitional fork occurs.
6.5 Taking a fork supported by the largest
number of voters
When a block is added to the chain (O), it takes a
few seconds to disseminate the result to the entire
network to form a new chain (N). Thus, during the
time, another merger may try to add another block
to the chain O. This causes forking of the chain
to make another chain (N’) as shown in Figure 3.
The chain forking means that two versions of the
ledger exist, which obviously should be resolved. On
the PoP network, choosing the proper chain is done
by voting. When two or more forks are competing
each other to become a main chain, mergers choose
the fork that has the larger accumulated number of
signatures, which means that more people have sup-
ported the chain. The accumulated distance can be
subtracted from the number of signers to choose the
longest chain to reflect the signer group quality. The
merger knows that the block possibly in the future
may be dropped owing to the poor signer group
quality. Thus, its strategy can be either to try to add
the block with a poor signer group immediately or to
search for a better signer group spending more time.
Instead of choosing the highest score fork, we
can put an additional mechanism to reduce the
number of transitional forks causing unwanted trans-
action drop rate. That is, a merger has to wait for a
time duration determined by the score of the signer
group quality to add a block.
6.6 Confirmation level
When a block Bi is added to the chain, and the next
block Bi+1 is added to that chain, Bi gets one con-
firmation from the network. After a predetermined
number of confirmations, the block is permanently
added to the chain, and then another forking request
will not be accepted after this permanent confirma-
tion. Thus, the merger has to choose one among
the contending forked chains that has the earliest
time stamp for the last permanent confirmation.
This confines the forking contention within the time
frame since the last permanent confirmation. The
confirmation number should be determined by the
network diameter.
To enhance the throughput, we can adopt
the Greedy Heaviest-Observed Sub-Tree
(GHOST) [24], [25]. The idea is not to prune
a contending branch but to leave it to support the
block from which the branch has been forked. Now,
instead of choosing the longest chain, we choose
the heaviest chain that the largest population has
supported.
6.7 Difficulty control: the number of sign-
ers
New signers join in the network via mergers, and
they participate in signing process from the next
block. S is the number of signers to sign a block.
Difficulty level is to adjust S according to the current
block time statistics. It is calibrated by measuring
the amount of time of 1,800 block generation, and
the number is written in a block. If it is too slow
to gather S signatures, the minimum S can be very
small, for example, one.
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6.8 Scalability by local blockchains and
inter-chain protocol
For scalability of Gruut, every regional area (or
application) has its own local blockchain. All trans-
actions occurring within a region are processed as
already described. So, hundreds of local chains will
be running in parallel, which increases substantially
the processing speed (TPS). But what if a transaction
occurs across two local blockchains? When A on
a local chain in New York (NYC) wants to send
5 USD to B on a local chain in Boston (BOS),
”NYC sends 5 USD to B@BOS” transaction is
validated first by checking balance and processed
on the local chain in NYC, and then the same
transaction is processed on the chain in BOS. Thus,
an inter-transaction fee will be higher than an intra-
transaction processing fee because it involves more
mergers and signers. When B@BOS would like
to send some money to C@LAX (Los Angeles),
B@BOS’s balance will be validated first on the
chain in Boston.
Localization of chains and interoperability
across chains make the ledger manageable in terms
of size and speed. Because one local chain holds
only the transaction records occurring in a region,
the size of the ledger does not grow fast, and the
transaction processing is not delayed because of the
transaction volume. Also, the total TPS (transactions
per second) will greatly increase because multiple
local chains process transactions in parallel. Even
maintaining ledgers small, transactions across chains
are possible owing to the inter-chain protocol.
PoW/PoS-based network cannot easily adopt
Gruut’s local chain idea because of the security
problem. That is, mining is all about how much re-
sources nodes are able to control in those networks,
and thus, dispersed hashing powers (or stakes) in
multiple local chains can get together to control a
victim local chain with relatively small amount of
resources. Gruut network runs by identified nodes,
however, are not vulnerable to this attack.
7 MISCELLANEOUS
Time scalability by hot chain and cold chain.
Owing to interoperability between chains, we can
make our system time-scalable. A new chain is
created, it is advertised not to use the old chain,
and all the balances on the old chain are moved to
the new chain (hot chain). Then, the old chain can
be archived at peers’ storage (full nodes) as a cold
chain. If not all the balances are not transferred to
the new chain and then later a transaction request on
the old chain occurs, the archived chain can still be
used to transfer it to the new chain.
Receipt on the blockchain. Instead of storing only
the money transfer information, we can store the
context information also to make it possible to
realize an incorruptible online receipt on the chain.
To save storage space of the ledger and for better
privacy, only the hash value of the transaction is
stored in the ledger, while the original transaction
information is separately stored by the bank.
International remittance. Obviously, it is possible
to remit internationally money from an account at
one chain in a country to one in another country. By
applying the exchange rate, recording the transaction
at the source chain first and then at the destination
chain using the local chain interoperation procedure
completes the international remittance.
Digital signatures. By Gruut signers and mergers,
any secure (EUF-CMA secure) digital signature can
be used in the platform, such as RSA-OAEP [26],
ECDSA [27], DSA [28], Pairing-based signatures,
etc. If the network bandwidth is not enough, an
aggregate signature may be used to compress a large
number of signatures [29].
8 GRUUT SIMULATION
This section shows simulation results conducted
using a discrete event network simulator NS3 on
Gruut network’s performance [30].
8.1 Simulator parameters
In Table 1, we summarize the parameters for our
simulation and compare Gruut network with other
blockchain networks. In the simulation, there are
10K nodes in total, including three types of nodes:
100 merger, 5,000 signers, and 4,900 full nodes.
Between nodes, we create point-to-point connection
channel. The average number of connections per full
node, signer, and merger are 10, 20, and 700, respec-
tively. Assuming the use of Internet speed similar
to that in South Korea, we set 39Mbps/13Mbps
(download/upload) for signers and full nodes and
150Mbs/150Mbps for mergers.
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Table 1
Parameter comparison between Gruut and other blockchains
Bitcoin Litecoin Ethereum Gruut
Total nodes 10K 2K 16K 10K
Miners 100 50 60 100 mergers
5K signers
Block genera-
tion time
10 m 2.5 m 10–20 s 10–20 s
Average
block size
735KB 22KB 25KB 30KB
We set five for the number of required signatures
in each block, while the difficulty parameter is set to
maintain the block interval time in the range from
15 to 20 seconds, which is used in Ethereum for
reasonable finalization and security strength [31].
Since we focus on our PoP protocol, we did not
simulate the case where transactions from normal
nodes are lost due to some network conditions.
8.2 Simulation results
Compared to the traditional PoW protocol of Bit-
coin, our PoP protocol consumes more network
bandwidth by mergers to send blocks to signers to
obtain signatures. In the simulation, however, only
0.054% up to 16.25% of transferred data is used by
mergers for sending blocks and less than 0.001% to
0.03% of data is used by signers for sending sig-
natures. We have conducted the simulation allowing
every merger to compete to produce a block without
applying merger group selection strategy. Only a
limited number of mergers will compete with the
strategy, and thus the bandwidth consumption and
the stale block rate will be greatly reduced.
To test the scalability of Gruut blockchain, sev-
eral blockchain instances—of which block sizes are
different—are examined, and the results are shown
in Table 2. Blocks are sent over all the nodes in the
network, so it becomes harder to keep all the nodes
in sync when the node size becomes bigger. As a
result, mergers could fall behind other competitors
in the race of creating a new block, and more forks
and more stale blocks are created. This transitional
forking leads to decentralization of the blockchain
system including on Gruut. In the simulation with
Gruut, the stale block rate is quite high when the
block size reaches 300KB or when TPS reaches
Table 2
Effect of the block size to other parameters. Transactions per
second (TPS) is calculated with the assumption that the
average size of a transaction is 0.15KB like in Ethereum. Stale
block rate is the fraction of blocks discarded owing to the
transitional fork. Block propagation represents the time from
when a merger broadcasts a signed block to when half of
nodes receive the block.
Block Block TPS Stale Block
Size Interval Block Rate Propagation
30.16KB 18.56 s 10.8 2.791% 0.78 s
76.73KB 17.58 s 29.1 5.530% 0.99 s
144.95KB 17.60 s 54.9 7.175% 1.56 s
345.91KB 20.42 s 112.9 23.1% 2.91 s
100. However, considering that our PoP protocol
that consumes only a small amount of network band-
width compared to PoW protocol, which consumes
a lot of energy to generate a new block, the waste
of creating stale block is acceptable. Also, we note
that the merger group selection strategy has not been
applied to the simulation, so the stale block rate will
be substantially reduced when we apply it.
We note that the processing speed in the simu-
lation is just for one local chain. If N local chains
run in parallel over the globe, the total throughput
should be one local chain’s throughput multiplied
by N . For example, we can easily get 5,500 TPS
with 145KB block size (see Table 2) when 100 local
chains are running. Considering that Visa Inc. is
known to process about 141.0 billion transactions
in 2016 [32] (which is 4,471 TPS on average),
our approach running multiple local chains in par-
allel is practical enough to cover large amount of
transactions. Moreover, a number of techniques can
be applied to Gruut to increase the TPS without
increasing the block size. One of the most practical
solutions is splitting into many transactions that can
essentially be packaged into a single, smaller state
on the parent blockchain, which is implemented in
SegWit [33] and Plasma [34]. If both of them can
add 100x to the total TPS, then Gruut can gain
10,000x in scalability.
9 BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT IN FINAN-
CIAL SECTOR
Early innovations with blockchain technology have
been observed in payment sector, including projects
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Figure 5. Extrapolation of transactions per second by the num-
ber of local chains.
such as Bitcoin, Litecoin, Ripple, and Stellar. How-
ever, these have clear limitation of business expan-
sion due to the fact that they use only cryptocurrency
as a medium of exchange. As noted early, Gruut han-
dles fiat money as its main currency and GRU coin
is used in limited cases like payment of transaction
fee. Of course, merchant can suggest a dual price
posting where users have options to pay GRU or
fiat money. Benefits of using fiat money as a main
currency on Gruut are quite clear. Participants like
merchant/customer and sender/recipient can enjoy
volatility-resistant transactions and as a result a
lot of commercial transactions will occur on Gruut
Network.
9.1 Competitive edge over legacy financial
system
As a single trusted party, banks and card payment
player take profits for their providing trust and in-
termediation. By being provided with decentralized
trust instead of the centralized one, business entities
and customers in various business sectors will have
an alternative and thus competing technology to run
their business or to enjoy reduced transaction fees.
Considering many intermediate institutes involve
when it comes to cross-border remittance, Gruut
payment system with scalable and cost-efficient
technology has strong edge over legacy payment
system. With this, the following fiat-based DApps
can be developed:
(1) P2P bank paying operational fees to peers.
Any bank can run its business on Gruut ledger. They
advertise their financial instruments, recruit cus-
tomers by various promotions, let customers open
accounts on the ledger, and manage accounts. A
transaction should include a bank identifier so that
multiple banks are able to run their business on the
ledger. Multiple banks should compete each other
on the ledger to recruit more customers or to sell
more financial instruments to customers. Our P2P
ledger pushes banks to make a profit by focusing
on elaborating their financial instruments instead
of by collecting easy money (transaction fee) auto-
matically in exchange for using their central server
system. Now, the position changes. Banks and cus-
tomers have to pay the ledger fee for nodes who are
running the ledger by the transaction fee. Bank can
support customer’s transaction fees as a promotion,
and the fees are distributed fairly to nodes running
the ledger. We note here that customers are opt-in to
play a signer’s role in the ledger network, and thus
they are rewarded for processing transactions.
(2) P2P credit/debit card payment. In general, card
payment system fee rate ranges from 1.7% to 3.3%
in South Korea. With the spread of Gruut payment
system, it is possible to lower the payment fee rate
to, say, 0.5%. This reduction is possible because
our peer-to-peer ledger does not need to spend on
operational cost whereas the traditional card system
has to run its own data center. A bank runs the
credit card business on Gruut ledger. Here, transac-
tions are recorded whenever a payment occurs at a
merchant. Now, what a merchant should pay for the
system can be greatly reduced by reduced merchant
account fee, by excluding a card processor, and by
not using the bank’s central system. Essentially, all
the transaction-related fees (substantially reduced
amount) are distributed fairly to nodes supporting
the ledger network.
9.2 Two strategies to deal with fiat money
Theoretically, money is the claim right for real
values of product and service, and this claim is
effective with government guarantee in the modern
society. Gruut ledger running on fiat money sys-
tems is compatible with legacy financial systems,
and it might be able to provide customers with
the claim right. Simply recording fiat money trans-
actions on Gruut ledger, however, does not make
the real value transfer occur unless the belief that
a transaction on Gruut ledger is a legally-binding
contract is acquired. Cryptocurrency economy is
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not linked with real economy (linked only at an
exchange), so the matter in cryptocurrency system
boils down to the belief among participants within
the ecosystem. However, Gruut ledger connects and
binds fiat currency with real economy, and thus we
have to spread and disseminate the belief that a
transaction on Gruut ledger is safely bound with
the corresponding value transfer in real economy. To
resolve the issue, we propose two strategies: one is
to establish an operating company (say GruutCo.) to
provide customers with payment guarantee, and the
other is to let traditional banks run Gruut ledger to
replace their ledgers in data center with (p2p ledger-
as-a-service model) and to make them pay the fee.
(1) Payment guarantee within Gruut network.
A customer is required to deposit some amount of
fiat money to GruutCo. when the user signs up,
and GruutCo. sets the account’s balance on Gruut
ledger. Now, the money deposited can be freely
spent (in fiat) for payment at a merchant that accepts
our Gruut payment. Later, when a merchant wants
to withdraw its fiat money, GruutCo. can transfer
money in fiat currency from its bank account to the
merchant’s bank account. GruutCo. works only as
an entity providing payment guarantee, but it does
not manage the ledger for transactions and it does
not get any processing fee.
(2) Legal contract ledger-as-a-service. Gruut
ledger can be provided as a infrastructure for banks.
By doing so, Gruut ledger can be regarded as one
of nodes in a bank’s data center, and it can acquire
the status of ledger having legal contract. To make
this happen, strategic alliance with current financial
service platforms are necessary. Alliance with more
banks or other financial institutions means that Gruut
has acquired public trust on payment guarantee by
customers. On the one hand, this is a big challenge to
business expansion of Gruut payment network, but
on the other hand, it could be a great opportunity
if we can provide a reasonable mutual benefit both
to Gruut and to legacy financial institutes. Now,
most of the financial institutions keep eyes on the
evolution of blockchain technology to predict the
payment market trends. Some of them are exam-
ining how to utilize this technology to compete
with other players and to survive under the new
paradigm shift. First benefit that financial institution
can obtain from Gruut is cost reduction for payment
infrastructure. Especially, in cross-border remittance
and card payment with payment gateway (PG) and
acquirer, Gruut network is able to provide cost-
effective payment infrastructure to existing financial
institutions by removing and shortening complicated
payment steps. In addition to cost reduction, Gruut
is considerably superior to legacy financial one in
terms of security. Other than diversifying hackers’
attack points, Gruut provides more advanced secu-
rity by using identification-based voting to enforce
nodes to behave, unlike in other blockchain net-
works. Benefits from cost and security aspects let
existing financial institutions have enough motiva-
tion to collaborate with Gruut network.
9.3 Local mining and Gruut business de-
ployment
Unlike current blockchain projects, Gruut makes use
of node identification and local chains. This limits a
node to work or mine on a local Gruut ledger in its
country of residence. This limitation is fundamen-
tally different from the case of the blockchains out
there, where any node can contribute to the global
chain irrespective of its residency. Gruut business
strategy, therefore, is not to make one global single
ledger all at once, but to launch local Gruut ledgers
incrementally over regions.
10 CONCLUSION
In this white paper, we have proposed a new
blockchain technology called Gruut. By introducing
node identification, customer identification, and fiat
money as a main currency, the new ledger has over-
come many issues that could not be solved easily
by current blockchain technologies, including de-
centralization, incompatibility with legacy financial
platform, and scalability. We believe that Gruut will
give a new direction to blockchain technology, and
that Gruut will give great impact on the current busi-
ness model relying on a trusted third party gathering
transaction fees by lowering the fee and distributing
it to peers.
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APPENDIX A
A.1 Forging a block
To forge a block, an attacker has two options: one is
to forge signatures in the block, which is infeasible
owing to the EUF-CMA security property of the
signatures. Instead of breaking the cryptographic
signature, it can bribe the signing group of the block.
The other way is to change the singer group and put
signatures of its own signer group.
Replacing signer group. When an attacker modifies
a transaction in one block Bi to get B′i, it has to
get B′i signed by the signer group. If not to corrupt
them, it should change the signer group. For this,
the previous block Bi−1’s transaction records must
be modified to B′i−1, because the signer group is de-
termined by Bi−1’s records. This in turn involves re-
signing of the modified block B′i−1. The signer group
for the block Bi−1 won’t re-sign B′i−1 because they
already signed in the time frame, and thus, the signer
group for B′i−1 should be changed. Consequently,
modification of a block Bi involves recursive mod-
ification of Bi−1, Bi−2, . . . , B1 in backward. Also,
by changing the transaction in Bi, both the chain
hash stored in Bi+1 and the signer group of Bi+1 are
changed. Consequently, it involves both forward and
backward chain modification to change one block.
Bribery-corrupted or stolen key-compromised
signer group. By bribing a signer group or stealing
a key to forge a block, an attacker does not need to
change the previous blocks, because the signer group
for the current block Bi has not been changed, so
valid signatures by the correct but corrupted signer
group are added (See Figure 6). The attacker cares
only about the forward forgery. Owing to the change
of transactions and corresponding signatures, the
chain hash value and the signer group for the next
block Bi+1 essentially does not match with those of
the block in the honest chain. Therefore, the attacker
must bribe or compromise again the new signer
group to sign the block Bi+1. Now, the modified
block B′i+1 has a different signer group, a different
chain hash, but the same transactions, which causes
a different signature. For Bi+2, the very signer group
that has signed the block should be corrupted by the
attacker, which repeats to the last block of the chain.
The required number of corrupted signers to revert
the finalized voting is too large to be compensated
by the amount for the forged transaction.
51% attack. Assume that a double-spending at-
tacker is able to control q fraction of the total signers,
and an honest node can p. Because the signer group
is chosen uniformly at random, a double-spending
attacker has the success probability q to make the
next block, and an honest node has p. The analysis
to catch up with the honest chain by the double-
spending attacker starting z blocks behind is the
same as that in Bitcoin network [1]. If 51% (p < q)
of signers are controlled by the attacker, it is possible
to catch up the honest chain. However, to be success-
ful in this attack, the attacker should be able to bribe
51% of signers taking the risk of being reported.
A.2 Security economy, bounty, and penalty
There are multiple motivations that discourage the
attack against the ledger.
First and foremost, it is a fully-traceable real-
name-based ledger. The strongest drive comes from
the fact that every node has been already real-name
identified and every transaction on the ledger is fully
traceable. Thus, nodes in the network are fully aware
that crimes are perfectly traceable and it is highly
likely to be tracked down.
Second, secret fork is not possible, but pub-
lic advertising for forking is necessary. In PoW
network, a miner can secretly build up a fork for
double spending by computing PoW faster than
other miners until it catches up the honest chain,
and then it releases the secret fork to replace the
honest chain. However, in PoP network, a merger to
forge a block cannot do this secret forking, because
making a forking chain cannot but involve a large
numbers of signers to collude. The signers proposed
by the forging merger, however, already know that
the block has been already finalized with a high
probability (a block is finalized after the time of the
network diameter). Thus, the attacker should take the
risk that any signer will report the double spending
attempt to the authority.
Third, the incentive given to each colluding signer
is smaller than the transaction fee. Let f be the
transaction fee fraction, and TA be the maximum
amount limit per block. Also, a single transaction
is limited less than e of TA. Let Si and R be the
signer group for a block and the number of blocks
for finalization, respectively. The number of signers,
|Si|, should be determined by the network speed,
19
Figure 6. Forging a block is discouraged because a forger has to publicly advertise to gather colluders, and the share is less than
the fee, bounty, and penalty.
and R by the network diameter. For simplicity, we
let S˜ be the average number of signers for a block.
The best case scenario for the attacker is to forge the
block that has just been finalized because it needs
the minimum number of blocks to be re-signed. The
attacker is forging a block so that its own transaction
for spending money shall be removed. The forged
block loses e×TA transactions for attacker’s double
spending, and thus, e·f×TA should be compensated
to the colluding signers of the forged block. The
signer group for the next block now changes to a
new one, and they have to sign the next block to
the forged one. The following blocks are signed by
the same signer groups because the transactions do
not change, so they don’t get any extra income from
the new signing. Here, the colluding signers for the
following blocks are asked to sign again the same
block while they know it is double signing act. Now,
they have to choose whether to get in the collusion
or not. They have two concerning points: one is that
by network nodes, it is highly likely to be reported
for the double signing act. The other is that they
know the double signing act might lose their chance
to get the transaction fee. This is because the former
chain they have signed has obviously better chance
to win the transaction fee than the later chain that
they are about to collude has. To sum up, the share
a colluding signer can get is
e× TA− e · f × TA
R× S˜ (1)
Transaction fee that can be achieved by behaving
well is
f × TA
S˜
(2)
Therefore, a signer will compare Eq.(2) to Eq.(1).
By simple algebra, we can get f ′ = e/(R+e). When
f is greater than or equal to f ′, a signer will behave.
If we set e = 0.1(10%), and R = 10, then we can
set f ′ be less than 0.01(1%). This means that the
transaction fee 1% is enough to prevent colluding
attack if the maximum portion of a single transaction
in a block is limited to 10% and a block is confirmed
after 10 blocks including the block are added.
Fourth, bounty and penalty. To protect the net-
work, we can introduce the bounty given to the
reporter of double spender and the penalty to the
attacker. A potential attacker is not likely to try to
forge the ledger if the penalty is more than the profit
by the forgery considering that it should publicly ad-
vertise and recruit the signers to collude. A random
signer is more prone to report the double spender
because the bounty is set to be higher than the share
it can get when it colludes for illegal forgery. Both
the bounty and the penalty should be set to be higher
than ((1− f) · e× TA)/(R× S˜).
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Last, the incentive to be given by the attack
is limited by the system policy that sets the
maximum transaction value (e.g., 10% of the
total in a block). If a transaction is high in price,
the transaction should be split into many small
transactions to discourage the attack. Max profit that
colluders get is limited. By setting TA small for
each block, the incentive of attackers gets small. For
example, if we set TA USD 10,000 and S˜ 10, the
maximum profit for each colluder is only USD 9.9
considering that R = 10, e = 10%, and f = 1%.
USD 9.9 does not seem to be enough to take part in
the crime in a fully traceable network.
